Introduction
The anthropological foundation of economic discourse continues to embody a limited conception of personal well-being and the public good, taking little account of human capacities for moral sentiments and going well beyond the limited accounting of personal and immediate gains.
There has been a recent upsurge of interest among economists toward this problem, motivated by, on the one hand, recognition that a proper understanding of our world presupposes overcoming the reductionist character of much contemporary economic theory which seems unable to cope with present-day problems such as environmental protection; growing social inequalities; insecurity despite growing affluence; transformation of family structures and, in particular, promoting market-based post-communist economies; and on the other hand, the awareness that reductionism is a major impediment to economic ideas and a shelter for conventional approaches from criticism and competing perspectives in other disciplines.
A growing number of economists and psychologists have become involved in debates of common interest, leading to new directions in research and ground for discussion.
This trend should be understood in the context of intellectual migration. And like most migrations, this appears to have its roots in factors of attraction and repulsion, in dissatisfaction towards existing arrangements, and in the hope that a broader horizon may enrich research.
The attempt at overcoming the shortcomings of economic reductionism will be well received by the profession, provided one succeeds in showing that such an attempt can amend some of the discipline's apories, as well as strengthening its grip on realityespecially so if one wants to contribute something relevant about the prospects of economic progress.
Exchange of equivalent relations versus reciprocity relations
In modern economics, relations among human beings are invariably reduced to relations of exchange of equivalents. The economic universe is made up of various economic worlds, each characterized by the prevalence of a specific type of relations. Yet, the (ontological) assumption of economic reductionism is that all types of social relations can be modelled as some variant of exchange relations. In so doing, the discipline is imposing upon itself a Nessus shirt that prevents a thorough investigation of economic relations which, although they do not appear to be of the exchange relations type, are of economic relevance. This is the case with the relations of reciprocity (Zamagni, 2000) . Kolm (1994) formalizes the reciprocity relation as a series of bidirectional transfers, independent of one another yet interconnected (Zamagni, 1999) . Independence implies that each transfer is voluntary; no transfer is a prerequisite for the occurrence of the other as there is no external obligation in the mind of the transferring subject. The transfers implied by the exchange of equivalents are each the prerequisite of the other. This is not the case with reciprocity, although market exchange and reciprocity oppose command relations. At the same time, there is more freedom in reciprocity than in the exchange of equivalents where each transfer in one direction is made compulsory by transfer in the opposite direction. Reciprocity's other characteristic -bidirectional transfers -is what distinguishes such relations from pure altruism which expresses itself in isolated one-directional transfers. In both cases, transfers are independently voluntary, hence one can say that reciprocity takes the intermediate position between market exchange and pure altruism.
The reciprocity relation demands some kind of balance between what one gives and what one expects to obtain, a balance not expressed in a definite exchange relationship (or relative price), since it can vary according to which moral dispositions, like sympathy and benevolence, are put into practice by the subjects involved. However, reciprocity has its own strategic dimension, as it happens in any interaction among individuals: 'should the recipient of my transfer not reciprocate, at a later moment I will somehow put an end to our relationship'. Thus, the difference with the exchange of equivalents is twofold. In market exchanges the determination of the exchange ratio logically precedes the transfer of the object exchanged -only after buyer and seller have agreed on the house price will the exchange take place. In the reciprocity relation, the transfer precedes, both logically and temporally, the reciprocated object. Under reciprocity, the person who starts the relation has an expectation -not an obligation -that the other will reciprocate.
Second, reciprocity ties may modify the outcome of the economic game, whether by stabilizing pro-social behaviours by agents interacting within contexts of the prisoner's dilemma kind, or because the reciprocity practice tends to modify endogenously the preferences themselves, that is to say the form of individuals' objective-functions Sacco and Zamagni, 1997; Sen, 1967) . For example -if I need help under circumstances enabling me to reciprocate only at a later time, while I cannot credibly commit myself, a rational agent in the sense of the rational choice paradigm, although he is in a position to help me, will not do so if, knowing that I am too a self-interested individual, s/he expects that I will not reciprocate his/her favour. Things will differ if my potential help-giver knows I am a fellow who practises reciprocity.
In view of this, one understands why reciprocity cannot be explained in terms of self-interest alone: economic literature fettered to the rational choice scheme cannot account for reciprocity, nor can the latter be understood as a special case of a repeated game (Ben-Ner and Putterman 1997; Fehr and Gächter, 1997; Sacco and Zamagni, 2001) . A second observation is that market systems are compatible with many cultures, defined as lasting patterns of behaviour. In turn, the degree of compatibility of market systems with cultures is not without effect upon the overall efficiency of the systems themselves. Thus, one should expect that a culture of individualism will produce different welfare results from a culture of reciprocity. But cultures are not to be taken as given and beyond analysis, since they respond to institutional engineering. Development policies must evaluate the cultural impact of a given set of market institutions and allow for correctional mechanisms that keep positional externalities and positional competition under control. Formal analysis suggests that the persistent action of an institutional network that makes people familiar with the benefits of reciprocity may make a big difference in this respect.
Contrary to what might be assumed, even casual examination suggests that reciprocity is widespread. Not only is it practised within families, in small informal groups, by associations of various kinds, but the transactions network based on the practice of reciprocity is present in all enterprises that fill the non-profit world, from co-operatives in which reciprocity takes the form of mutuality, to voluntary organizations where reciprocity verges on altruism, on the free gift.
The bulk of social life consists of interrelated other-oriented behaviour, motivations, and sentiments which are neither purely self-interested 'exchanges' nor pure unilateral gift giving. This is the field of reciprocity, of which the gift/return-gift relation constitutes the simplest form and component, but which includes many steadier and more complex relations. Reciprocity is a major type of social interaction in all encounters, groups and organizations. Family life is essentially reciprocity, with only occasional strict exchange or pure command which are often embedded in a larger reciprocity. Some of the most perceptive analyses of society (especially anthropology and sociology) have seen reciprocity as the basic social fact that keeps society members together. Giving should be seen as the basic social act, and reciprocity is the basic fact constitutive of a society and the door to inter-subjectivity. Often, reciprocity is the mean and vector of mutual self-interest, but it also implies positive sentiments and attitudes toward others, such as gratitude, consideration, empathy, liking, fairness, and a sense of community. This is why reciprocity and gift giving have a particularly important normative function. The normative evaluation of economic situations and transfers is a prime concern of economics. However, the good society is made of good acts, not only of productive actions and pleasurable gestures; of good social relations, not only of profitable exchanges; and it is made of good people, not only satisfied ones. The common conception of a good act or person values altruism and gratitude and condemns selfishness. People appreciate positive social sentiments, attitudes and actions. These behaviours constitute the way to overcome many classical failures and inefficiencies engendered by purely selfcentred interactions. The presence of these sentiments and attitudes can be affected by policy, since they depend not only on education and imitation, but also on institutional settings which can favour them or rely on them and hence reward them, or can have the opposite effects. Hence, any social ethics, in particular normative economics, that disregard the possibilities (and analysis) of reciprocity bypasses a major dimension of its topic. Social evolution is always favourably influenced by the presence of diverse rules controlling various economic spheres. The principle of comparative advantage applies not only at the level of goods and services but also for economic institutions. The market is more than a mechanism driven by demand and supply forces. As a social institution, it embodies specific rules, the product of cultural matrices, conventions, established practices. On the other hand, the welfare of citizens and communities is not just a given aspect that can be negligibly influenced by human action; it is the consequence of the way adopted by human beings living in a society to shape community life. This is why it does not make sense to raise the question as to the choice between the reciprocity principle and the equivalentexchange principle. We do not possess any criterion on which to base our choice. It is unrealistic to think that all transactions can be based upon the 'culture of contract', the exchange of equivalents. If the culture of contract fails to integrate with the culture of reciprocity the potential of the whole system will be damaged.
A strong stimulus towards recognition and acceptance of the psychological perspective in economic thinking is linked to recent developments in theories relating to decisions and utility. The term utility can be applied to the actual experience of the result of an individual's choice, or to the preference (or desire) for that result. Jeremy Bentham defines the utility of an object in hedonistic terms
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as the capacity of that object to actually procure pleasure; Pareto's ordinalism (Italian economist 1848 (Italian economist -1923 Pareto, 1906) focuses on the preference or desirability for an object, through which utility becomes a theoretical construct inferred by observed choices.
These two notions of utility have the same dimension if we were justified in imagining that, in general, individuals wish for or prefer what they ultimately obtain or experience. But this hypothesis is unacceptable, hence we have to make use of (at least) two notions of utility: the experienced utility of a result and the decision utility of a result (Kahneman, 1993) . This opens up new perspectives in the study of rationality, a central pillar of economic analysis.
To employ a new framework for the study of rationality, we need to realize that the criterion we use to distinguish between rational and non-rational behaviour is of a substantive kind: we ask ourselves if the beliefs of individuals are supported by evidence, and if decisions further their interests. Yet the conception of rationality adopted in economic discourse is of a logical kind: the beliefs or preferences of the individual are rational if they obey a certain set of formal rules or norms. This means that the content of the beliefs and preferences is not part of the scientific discourse on rationality: what is of interest is its internal coherence. It has been argued that rationality has to do with the cogent relations between the objectives pursued and the choices made by the individual on the one hand, and the choices made and the consequences deriving from them on the other.
Experienced utility remains external to the subject's preferential system; it presupposes a mode of evaluating the results of the choices just as decision utility materializes, not so much as they are evaluated by the individual when the decision is taken. The question central to the rational calculus becomes the verification of whether an individual's choices maximize the expected utility of the consequences deriving from those choices, as the latter are actually experienced by the individual. The accurate forecast of future preferences and exact evaluation of past experiences emerge as critical aspects of an individual's ability to be rational in a substantive sense. It is precisely the incapacity demonstrated by economic agents to foresee future experiences and to learn from the past that constitutes new challenges to the assumption of rationality.
How much do individuals know about their future tastes? Can an external observer (or government authority) make more accurate predictions than single individuals? Can economic agents keep the uncertainty of their future preferences in mind when they take decisions? If not, what economic institutions can be set up to diminish this uncertainty? The implications at the politicaleconomic level are obvious.
Economic rationality: beyond the intentional action paradigm
The foregoing helps us to focus on the core of a second form of reductionism: the sphere of economic rationality is reduced to the sphere of rational choice. We know that most human actions have not only intentions but also dispositions, as economists have known from the time of Adam Smith (1723-1790) (Smith, 2002) . So, the danger of applying rationality to intentional actions is that actions prompting the principle of reciprocity are judged irrational by standard economic analysis. Yet the conscious pursuit of one's selfinterest is incompatible with its attainment: an 'irrational' response based on reciprocity leads to better results than the one conforming to the exchange of equivalents paradigm. This paradox is the exact opposite of that exemplified by the writings of Adam Smith (Smith, 2002) .
To explain this paradox, we need to consider the possible discrepancy between the individual's memory and actual experience: the results (or consequences) of a particular choice extend, usually, over a specific period, so that the evaluation of a sequence of results is retrospective. An example of discrepancy between momentary utility and retrospective utility is examined in the model of remembered utility by Kahneman and others (Kahneman, 1993) .
Let us assume we possess a scale of levels of annoyance, or inconvenience over an individual's experience of consumption. The profile will show momentary peaks of the greatest annoyance, followed by momentary troughs of relief. We would think that the longer the episode lasts, the 'worse' the overall quality of that experience will be.
Yet, what Kahneman and others have found is that at the end of the experience, in the memory of the subject, the dimension of duration disappears, and in the overall evaluation of 'remembered' inconvenience only two pieces of data remain -the momentary highest peak in the course of the experience and the level of annoyance in the terminal phase. The rest, with the passing of time, vanishes from memory.
Similarly, there is a marked difference between utility registered moment by moment and 'remembered' utility. We can no longer calculate the value that, rationally, we now have to assign to a future event. We need to calculate now what the retrospective utility of a particular consumer experience will be in the future, to calculate its utility as it will be relived in memory.
Which utility does the rational agent have to maximize? The momentary or retrospective one? What is a rational action in situations in which, with added resources, it is possible to improve the quality of the final moment: increase the utility of today or the remembered utility of tomorrow?
Traditional decision theory imposes a set of conditions for the rationality of choice which cannot exclude that decisions manifestly stupid may be judged to be rational. The ultimate meaning of recent developments in this area of economic research is thus to indicate the urgency of setting substantive criteria of evaluation alongside decision analysis using formal logic. The entry of criteria, based on the independent evaluation of the quality of the results of choices, may allow a stricter, more rigorous definition of rationality, that would also pass the test of logical coherence. The moment we speak of substantive criteria of evaluation to increase the explanatory power of rationality, it is no longer possible to disregard the psychological dimension of the economic problem.
An effective characterization of economic rationality cannot do without a careful modelling of the social and cultural facets of the environment (Granovetter, 1992; Pearson, 1998) . But, to what extent are agents' choices conditioned by the preexisting social environment rather than by explicit optimizing calculations? It is clear that individual choices are conditioned by the preexisting social environment, and these social conditionings cannot be traced back completely to individual optimizing behaviours (Argyle and Henderson, 1985; Elster, 1989) . But, we can hardly say that individuals are never able to recognize that some courses of actions are more rewarding than others.
Correct representation of such interplay calls for a theoretical setup which can: (a) explain how the two forces (social and cultural factors versus optimization) interact and how this interaction feeds back on the ongoing social relations, and (b) explain how the structure of this interaction tends to be modified by ongoing social relations. The key notion seems to be that of coevolutionary dynamics: individual behaviours and social norms evolve jointly as micro and/or macro changes in social norms which prompt adjustments in individual behaviours and vice versa. Evolutionary game theory, while proving the right tool for studying the 'short run' dynamics of social conventions, proves (a), inadequate to deal with the co-evolution of norms themselves and (b), the relationship between observables like economic institutions and 'unobservable' like individual dispositions is a two-way one; institutions and dispositions co-evolve through a complex, typically non-linear, process which is history-dependent.
A 'unified' framework is needed, where behaviours contain 'hidden' norms that remain frozen and become salient whenever the corresponding behaviours spread over the population of agents. A promising attempt comes from the merger of social network analysis and the theory of evolutionary games. A 'network game' (Ellison, 1993; Macy, 1996; Morris, 1997) , is a social network matrix whose entries measure the relation between two or more agents. Each player is influenced by the others not only through the game but also by the specific set of relationships expressed by the social network matrix. The fact that actors are interested not only in the outcomes of their interactions with others, but also in the relations they establish provides a double target. First, it explains behaviours which, according to the traditional models of rational choice, would remain unjustified (e.g. why do people vote in elections; why do people donate to charities, etc.). Second, it throws light upon one of the most intriguing dimensions of social welfare, i.e. the fact that our welfare, our well-being, increasingly depends on relational goods. Such a unified framework calls for a rethinking of the rational choice model and, ultimately, of the postulate of methodological individualism upon which it is built. It is not necessary to abandon methodological individualism, but to go beyond it, since the core elements on which individual choices are based evolve as a consequence of repeated social interaction. What economic theory needs is a new organizing principle, a redistribution of emphasis away from the individual level of analysis and towards the relational one.
E. Sober and D. Sloan Wilson (Sober and Wilson, 1998 ) provide a starting point for the elaboration of a methodology to study the problems of complex social behaviours and of the dispositional and social framework supporting them. The authors maintain that the
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natural and cultural evolution can only be understood in antiindividualistic terms: selection is a modular hierarchical process acting simultaneously at different levels, each with its own 'selective units', cohesive and structured social groups (see also Arrow, 1994) .
Utility and happiness
Economics has always been considered the 'queen' of social sciences due to its alleged superior ability to explain human behaviour by rigorous and mathematically elegant reasoning. This stated superiority has produced an increasingly hegemonic attitude on the part of economists who attempted a 'colonization' of research areas traditionally the domain of other social sciences. Townsend (1988) insists that the variety of social frameworks and institutions as evidenced by socio-cultural anthropology are but contingent expressions of the aggregation of optimizing (i.e. utility maximizing) individual choices. The most extreme expression of this research project is undoubtedly from Gary Becker of the University of Chicago (Becker, 1996) whose working hypothesis is that of hypostatization of an extreme individualistic concept of behaviour seen as rational 'translation' of a preference system representing the deep essential level of human identity (see also Pareyson, 1995) .
The application of Becker's logic to human behaviour tends however to produce a profound feeling of incongruity. The problem is that homo Beckerianus is a subject so completely devoted to rational pursuit of its own utility as to be unaware that in order to do so it has to manipulate, systematically and explicitly, other people's behaviours and choices. Within the utilitarian perspective, as stressed by A. Sen (1967) among others, we see the 'other' as a mere instrument for the attainment of our utilitaristic goals. On the other hand, it is widely accepted that happiness postulates the existence of the 'other' as an end in itself.
Man is a relationship, not in that he stands in relation to, or entertains a relation with: man is a relationship, more specifically a relationship to the (ontological) being, to the other. (Pareyson, 1995: 23) The reduction of happiness to utility generates problems because a large number of social interactions and major existential decisions acquire significance merely thanks to the lack of instrumentality. If 26 Group Analysis 37 (1) distribution.
we were aware that a generous action were prompted by a precise utilitaristic and manipulative logic, it would acquire a totally different aspect and substantially alter the way it is received and the behavioural responses it elicits. However, there is no room for this vision within a conceptual perspective in which the social dimension is merely the sum of the individual ones. Within the realm of private goods, all accomplishments economic theory attributes to the utilitarian approach hold true and the more coincides with the better. All the elegant simplicity of our models comes to an end when one introduces relational goods.
The reduction of human experience to the 'accountancy' dimension of utilitarian calculus is not just an act of intellectual arrogance, it is methodological naïvety (B. Frey, 1997 ; see also Antoci, Sacco and Zamagni, 1999) .
The early history of economic science is characterized by the centrality of the happiness category. Economics is seen as the 'science of happiness' whose fundamental target was to answer the question: 'what should I do to be happy?' The titles of books written by early economists reveal such preoccupation -Muratori's Della felicità pubblica (On public happiness, 1749); Giuseppe Palmieri's Riflessioni sulla pubblica felicità (Reflections on public happiness, 1805); Pietro Verri's Discorso sulla felicità (Discourse on happiness, 1763). It is only with the 'marginalistic revolution' that the category of utility completely superseded that of happiness within economic discourse (Dixon, Frank, Ng and Oswald, 1997) . Hirsch (1976) introduces the concepts of positional goods and positional competition. In short, all goods whose demand cannot be met by economic growth -for the reason that increase in wealth generates an increased positional demand -are called positional. Let us consider education. Up to a certain level, education is essentially a public good, one whose consumption cannot be ruled out and which generates positive externalities. Beyond this level, education tends to become a positional good: even though it is in demand for its intrinsic properties, its consumption produces a decreasing utility as generalized consumption rises.
Positional goods have two undesirable peculiarities (Pagano 1990 ). The first is inequality: one can make use of a positional good only if it is unequally distributed among a large number of subjects (power or status symbols). Second, the global rate of growth for positional goods is zero, since it is impossible for everybody to raise the consumption of such goods (Screpanti and Zamagni, 1994) .
Zamagni: Towards An Economics of Human Relations 27
Thus we realize why the new form of positional competition is dangerous. As Tocqueville (1835) foreshadowed, positional competition 'arises from equality as a prerequisite and aims at overcoming it: equality in principle sets in motion the quest for de facto inequality'. The worrying side of positional competition is that instead of improving, it worsens both individual and social wellbeing by producing waste from affluence, disrupting the social texture, such as the recent phenomenon of 'gated communities' in the U.S. As many as over four million Americans live in these artificial communities, not so much for fear of crime, but to meet a positional demand: the desire to reconstruct a community and a sense of belonging.
Relational goods (friendship is a typical relational good), are being replaced by positional goods, goods that confer utility for the status they create, for the relative position in the social scale that their consumption allows people to occupy. Whereas with relational goods the relationship with the other is one of reciprocity, with the positional good, the essential feature is positional competition: they who win, win everything and those who lose, lose everything.
What are the most important effects of positional competition? First, consumerism: what counts is the relative level of consumption, positional competition leads to a race to consume more than others. Second, the destruction of relational goods. Third, beyond a certain limit, the increase of expenditure on consumption does not produce increased happiness. many, perhaps the majority, of the pleasures of life do not have a price, are not for sale, and therefore do not pass through the market. (Lane, 2000: 59) Once we get on to the subject of happiness, economics cannot do without psychology.
The most effective and cheapest antedote against positional competition is an intervention on the supply of relational goods. A relational good has a twofold connotation. With respect to the production side, it demands the participation of all members in the organization, but the terms of 'sharing' are not negotiable. This implies that the incentive to participate in the production of the relational good cannot be external to the relationship among these members: the other's identity does matter. With respect to the consumption side, the fruition of a relational good cannot be pursued overlooking the condition of need and the preferences of other subjects because the 'relationship with the other one' is a constituent of the consumption act (Uhlaner, 1989) .
In the supply of relational goods, communication becomes the key term. The more relational goods are the product of what is shared, and the more they result from a commonly shared background intention, the better they perform. As T. Nagel writes:
Altruism depends on a recognition of the reality of the other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many. Altruism is not to be confused with generalized affection for the human race. It is not a feeling. (1970: 3) .
The general thesis to be defended concerning altruism is that one has a direct reason to promote the interests of others -a reason which does not depend on intermediate factors such as one's own interests or one's antecedent sentiments of sympathy and benevolence. (1970: 18) .
We can now understand why relational goods are the very opposite of positional goods and why the undertakings and organizations of civil economy are the ideal 'factory' to produce them. If the private sphere of the market tends to exclude all subjects lacking purcasing power, the civil sphere tends to include everyone provided they are capable of reciprocity. Therefore, if the primum movens of growth in the post-industrial age is social capital, and if this is but the sum total of relational goods, one infers that the expansion of a civil economy is the most effective strategy against the diffusion of the disruptive positional competition.
Conclusion
The search for a way to humanize the economy contains a demand of relationality which one should carefully investigate and satisfy if one wants to dispel perverse effects. How good the performance of an economic system is depends also on whether certain conceptions and ways of life have achieved dominance. As a growing number of economic scholars have stressed, economic phenomena have a primary interpersonal dimension. Individual behaviours are embedded in a pre-existing network of social relations which cannot be regarded as a mere constraint. Rather, they are one of the driving factors that prompt individual gools and motivations. The central problem in the current transition towards a post-industrial society is to understand how individuals may be at liberty to decide the procedures for the supply of the goods they demand. What is at stake here is not so much freedom to decide the overall composition of goods to be produced (more of private versus more public goods; more merit versus more relational goods), but freedom to decide how that composition should be achieved. One cannot advocate the efficiency principle in order to decide what and how to produce. Admirers of the market as a social institution seem to overlook the fact that it is the hegemonic expansion of private economy that will slowly destroy the whole system of social norms and conventions which constitute a civil economy. It has to be accepted that the hypertrophic growth of both state and private market is a major explanation of the many problems within our societies. The solution cannot be found in the radicalization of the public economy versus private economy alternative, or neo-statism versus neo-liberalism, but in a healthy flourishing of those forms of organization that shape a modern civil economy.
The most obnoxious consequence of a narrow-minded notion of market is to lead us to believe that a behaviour inspired by values other than non-tuistic self-interest inexorably drives economy to disaster. By encouraging us to expect the worst of others, such vision eventually brings out the worst in us. It hampers the exploitability of such inclinations as trust, benevolence, reciprocity, since that vision perceives these inclinations as merely inborn peculiarities of human nature, unrelated to the civilization process in progress in our societies. As Wolfe points out:
. . . The problem with reliance on the [private] market as a moral code is that it fails to give moral credit to those whose sacrifices enable others to consider themselves freely choosing agents. By concentrating on the good news that we can improve our position, rather than the not-so-good, but socially necessary, news that one might consider the welfare of others as our direct concern, the market leaves us with no way to appreciate disinterest. (1989: 102) Since motivations sustaining the principle of reciprocity are motives whose fulfilment is at least as legitimate as the fulfilment of selfinterested motives, a truly liberal society should not prevent the growth and dissemination of the former to the detriment of the latter. In the absence of actual competition among different subjects of supply of various goods, the citizen-consumer will be left with reduced freedom. One might end up living in a more and more affluent society, but more and more 'indecent' and, ultimately, desperate. The reduction of human experience to the 'accountancy' 30 Group Analysis 37 (1) distribution.
